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Abstract
In a local interaction model agents situated on a circle play bilateral prisoners’ dilemmas
with their immediate neighbors and have three possible strategies: cooperate in all inter-
actions (altruistic), defect in all interactions (egoistic), or cooperate with one immediate
neighbor with probability 1/2 (partial cooperation). After each period the agents adopt
the strategy with the highest average payoff in their observed local neighborhood (na¨ıve
imitation). The absorbing states of the process are outlined and analysed. There does
not exist an absorbing state in which the partially cooperative strategy coexists with any
of the other strategies. The partially cooperative strategy limits the diffusion of altruistic
behavior in the population. Even though clustering of altruists is generally beneficial
for sustaining altruism, relatively big groups of altruists at the onset actually enable the
spread of the partially cooperative strategy.
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1 Introduction
A lot of economic thought has been devoted to the factors and systems that are conducive
to altruism, so that public goods can be sufficiently financed and the systems in place can
be upheld efficiently and sustainably. While theoretical work has identified that altruistic
behavior has slim chances of survival if agents use best responses, many results point to
the fact that altruism can be sustained in a local interaction framework where the agents
are imitators (Bergstrom and Stark, 1993; Eshel et al., 1998; Young, 1998; Bergstrom, 2002;
Levine and Pesendorfer, 2007). A common feature of these models is that they often include
two possible strategies for the agents involved: they are either cooperators or non-cooperators,
i.e. altruists or egoists (Nowak and May, 1992; Ellison, 1993; Fosco and Mengel, 2011; Garc´ıa-
Mart´ınez and Vega-Redondo, 2015). However, there is evidence that at least three general
types of people can be distinguished in an organisation: givers, takers and matchers (Grant,
2013). Givers are cooperating altruists, takers are non-cooperating egoists, and matchers
strive for a balance in their giving and receiving (Ma¨thner and Lanwehr, 2017).
Attempting to bring the models closer to observed reality, this paper adds a third possible
strategy to the public goods game of Eshel et al. (1998) by allowing the agents to treat their
neighbors differently, cooperating with only some of them, i.e. they exhibit partial cooperation
and contribute to one of their neighbors and are egoistic to the other one. Which of the
neighbors they would cooperate with depends on a probabilistic realization. This happens on
a fixed simplified network structure, a circle, and using na¨ıve imitation such that at each period
agents imitate the strategy with the highest average payoff in their observed neighborhood.
The range that agents immediately affect with their choices and about which they have full
information with regards to chosen strategies and obtained payoffs consists of only their two
direct neighbors.
The local interaction intrinsic in the model allows its interpretation as a local public goods
model. Local public goods are public goods that can be enjoyed in a particular geographic
area. In a broader context, this means that a selection of all agents work together towards a
common goal and, if achieved, the goal would benefit everyone in the neighborhood equally.
It is possible to conceptualise the local communities as clubs formed to provide local public
goods (Hindriks and Myles, 2013). The concept of local public goods can be used in contexts
involving various scales, from considering the interactions of different countries or states on
climate control acts to very small scale interaction involving a few participants, for example,
pair programming.1
It is difficult to foresee how altruism would fare in such an environment, especially if the
partial cooperators have an equal chance of cooperating or not with a particular neighbor.
The current paper addresses this main research question by investigating the absorbing states
1This is a way of developing software whereby two programmers work on one work station – one of them
writing the code and focusing on the technical aspects of the current code, while the other one reviews the
code and considers the strategic direction of the work. The two participants often change roles.
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of the resulting process, their frequency of occurrence, times to absorption, and initial con-
figurations of agents’ strategies that are most supportive of outcomes with a high proportion
of altruist acts.
One of the main results of this paper is that the partially cooperative strategy cannot
coexist with the other strategies in an absorbing state. In fact, the partially cooperative
strategy hinders the spread of altruism by enabling the egoists’ strategy even more than it
favors its own proliferation in the population. Somewhat in contrast to other models, due to
this underlying dynamic, relatively big groups of altruists at the beginning stage are beneficial
for the partial cooperators, who in turn facilitate the egoists. Even though clustering of
altruists is assumed to be best for cooperative outcomes, here a middle range of segregation
of altruists helps the spread of altruism the most.
This paper contributes to the strand of literature on public goods in networks. Since
models that rely on a best response dynamic typically produce results dominated by egoistic
behavior (Young, 1998), many models have assumed boundedly rational behavior, expressed
by a variety of decision rules. These span from imitating the strategy with the highest
average payoff in the observed neighborhood (Eshel et al., 1998), to imitating the strategy
with the highest payoff (Matros, 2012), additionally taking the linking choices of the imitated
agents into account (Fosco and Mengel, 2011), etc. These behavioral decision rules imply
little oversight of the agents over the game or system that they are part of and little or no
knowledge of the available strategies and their potential payoffs.
To elaborate on the latter two contributions, Matros (2012) investigates whether altruism
can survive when agents can choose between na¨ıve imitation and myopic best-reply rules. He
finds that altruistic behavior can be sustained if local neighborhoods are not too small or too
large both in short-run and in long-run settings. Moreover, when the agents can use both
decision rules, altruism survives in all cases except in those in which the decision rules are
introduced into the population randomly. In a setting with na¨ıve imitation and endogenous
link formation on a more complex graph, Fosco and Mengel (2011) find that coexistence of
cooperators and defectors is possible. However, it results in either their full separation or
the cooperators taking a central position in the graph and the defectors being marginalised.
Unlike the setting in the current model, not all agents revise their choices simultaneously
at every period, but only a random sample of them do so. Moreover, their model includes
different information and interaction neighborhoods and shows that the results are robust
towards variations in these neighborhoods. This is in contrast to Mengel (2009), where
under the framework of Eshel et al. (1998), the polymorphic states featuring altruists and
egoists are not stochastically stable if the agents use information from beyond their interaction
neighborhood. Mengel (2009) also finds that the co-existence result from Eshel et al. (1998)
does not extend to general networks. However, introducing conformist bias (if an action is
more popular, the agent is more likely to use it) stabilizes the cooperation results. Also Eshel
et al. (1999) and Eshel et al. (2000) find that, even with a bigger size of the information
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neighborhood as compared to the interaction neighborhood, altruism is sustainable. In this
study the finding crucially depends on a conservative learning assumption where an individual
adopts a specific strategy only if it is used by at least one of his immediate neighbors.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The next section describes the specifics
of the model. Afterwards, the absorbing states are first outlined analytically and next investi-
gated by means of computer simulations. The last section discusses the findings and contains
the conclusion.
2 The model
This model extends the model of local public goods provision of Eshel et al. (1998) by adding
the possibility for agents to be partially altruistic. Within this extended context it investigates
and showcases the dynamics of behavior when agents follow the na¨ıve heuristic to imitate
the strategy that performed on average the best among the strategies observed within their
neighborhoods.
2.1 Local public goods game
There are n ≥ 3 agents on a circle and N = {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} denotes the set of agents. Every
agent interacts with his two direct neighbors and exhibits either egoistic or altruistic behavior
towards each of them. All agents have three possible strategies at their disposal: the set of
strategies is S = {A,P,E}, where A represents the altruistic strategy, E represents the
egoistic strategy, and P represents the partially altruistic strategy.
Every two neighbors share a local public good (LPG). Altruistic contributions to the
LPG benefit the contributors and the neighbor with whom they share the good but they
also impose costs to the contributors. Agents who behave egoistically do not invest in a
particular LPG and thus bear no costs. However, they benefit from the LPG provision if
their neighbors have contributed. Altruists (A) contribute to both LPGs they can support
(i.e., the one they share with their left-hand and the one they share with their right-hand
neighbor), while egoists contribute to neither of them. The partially altruistic strategy (P )
enables agents to be altruistic to only one of their neighbors. Strategy P manifests itself in
two possible decisions: L, representing altruistic behavior towards the left-hand neighbor and
egoistic behavior towards the right-hand neighbor, and R, representing altruistic behavior
towards the right-hand neighbor and egoistic behavior towards the left-hand neighbor.2 If a
player uses the P strategy, then in every period he chooses each of the possible decisions, L
or R, with probability 1/2.
A state x = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) is given by a profile of strategies, so for all agents i ∈ N it
holds that xi ∈ S. Hence, the state space is X = Sn. The vector d = (d1, d2, . . . , dn) specifies
2Agents on the circle are numbered in clockwise direction such that agent i− 1 is left of agent i ≥ 2. Due
to the circular structure agent n is left of agent 1.
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the decisions for every player in a particular state. Given a player’s strategy xi ∈ S, his
decision di belongs to the set of decisions Di(xi) given by:
Di(xi) =

{A} if xi = A
{L,R} if xi = P
{E} if xi = E.
The decision space is D = {A,L,R,E}n. The feasible realizations in state x ∈ X belong to
D(x) =
∏
i∈N Di(xi).
Let pii : D → [−2c, 2] denote the payoff function for agent i, where c ∈ (0, 1/4) is a
fixed constant representing the cost of an altruist act. The function can be decomposed as
pii(d) = bi(d)− ci(d), given that the benefits for every agent are
bi(d) =

2 if di−1 ∈ {R,A} and di+1 ∈ {L,A}
1 if either di−1 ∈ {R,A} or di+1 ∈ {L,A}
0 otherwise
and the costs are
ci(d) =

2c if di = A
c if di ∈ {L,R}
0 if di = E.
Every interaction (with left-hand or right-hand neighbor) in which the agent is altruistic costs
him c and it brings him a benefit of NA, where NA ∈ {0, 1, 2} is the number of altruistic acts
towards him.3 For example, if an agent uses strategy A and is surrounded from the left
by a decision R and from the right by a decision L, then there are 2 altruist acts by his
neighbors towards him, 1 by each of his neighbors, while he commits 2 altruist acts towards
his neighbors. Therefore his payoff is 2 − 2c. Even though this payoff structure renders E
the sole survivor in a best response dynamic and the only rationalizable strategy, altruistic
behavior can survive when a na¨ıve imitation rule is adopted.
The partial strategy bridges the two extremes of behavior following from strategies A and
E. In reality people often prefer the middle ground and do not go for the extremes. There
are many conceivable ways to define a partial strategy. Examples are the reciprocal partial
strategy, which responds to a neighbor with the action he took in the previous period, or the
toss of a coin every period to determine if one would assume an A or E strategy. The current
paper’s definition of the partial strategy satisfies history-independence, generates exactly one
altruistic act with probability one, and treats the two neighbors symmetrically.
3The values for c are within (0, 1/4) because in case c > 1/4 altruism becomes too difficult to sustain
and even E and A strategies cannot coexist. It follows logically that the more expensive altruism is, the more
difficult it would be to sustain. In light of this observation, costs c in the interval (0, 1/4) are the most favorable
to altruism and therefore the most interesting to investigate. When c = 1/4 there are payoff ties and for this
reason the inequality is taken to be strict.
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2.2 Na¨ıve imitation dynamics
The agents interact repeatedly and can reevaluate their strategies once per period. Assuming
that every agent has full information about the strategies and payoffs of his direct neighbors,
the actions of the agents are based on na¨ıve imitation which is described by the following rule:
Every agent considers his direct neighbors’ payoffs in the current state and in the next period
imitates the strategy yielding the highest average payoff from the ones he observes, including
his own. This does not exclude that the agent plays his current strategy in the next period.
It also implies that if an agent and all his neighbors use the same strategy the agent will
continue employing this strategy. More formally, for some given agent i ∈ N at a decision
profile d ∈ D, let N is(d) = {j ∈ {i− 1, i, i+ 1} | dj ∈ Dj(s)} be the set of neighbors of agent
i (including agent i himself) that employ strategy s ∈ S and define:
µis(d) =

∑
k∈N is(d)
pik(d)
|N is(d)|
if |N is(d)| ≥ 1
−1 otherwise.
Here µis(d) gives the average observed payoff per strategy s for an agent i at decision profile
d. If a strategy is not observed in the neighborhood of the agent, then, for technical reasons,
it gets a value of -1, which ensures it will not be implemented. Then the na¨ıve imitation
decision rule articulated above can be summarized as f : D → Xn, where for i ∈ N it holds
that fi(d) = argmaxs∈S µis(d). The particular payoff functions ensure that the maximum
average payoff is uniquely determined.
Next, for x ∈ X, let
F (x) = {y ∈ X | there exists a d ∈ D(x) such that y = f(d)}
denote the set of states that, starting from x, can be reached with positive probability in one
iteration. In the presence of the P strategy, the set F (x) can contain more than one element.
Further, let Fm(x) denote the states that are reached with positive probability from x in m
steps (with F (x) = F 1(x)).
In the process outlined so far, agents follow a decision rule that requires only information
from the current state to fully define the next one – the crucial property for a Markovian
process. Let Qxy denote the probability to change from state x to state y after one single
iteration of the imitation process. It holds that Qxy > 0 if and only if y = f(d) with d ∈ D(x).
The matrix of transition probabilities [Qxy]x,y∈X , along with a specification of the initial state
x0 ∈ X, determines a Markov process on the state space X. A set of states X is absorbing if
it is a minimal set of states such that once a state in the set is reached, the Markov process
cannot leave this set. In other words, the system cannot transition into another minimal set
of states once it has reached this particular set of states (Ross, 2000). The absorbing sets of
the current imitation process will be examined in detail in Section 3.
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If every agent in a state uses the same strategy, then this produces a singleton absorbing
set. Therefore the model has at least three absorbing sets, corresponding to the three singleton
absorbing sets where all agents use strategies A, P, and E respectively. When only strategies
A and E are possible, once the E strategy appears in a state it can only be isolated in small
pockets but will never disappear. The P strategy leads to a “rock-paper-scissors” structure
and can potentially completely eliminate E strategies from states. These possibilities will be
explored further using simulations in Section 4.
2.3 Preliminaries
A number of definitions are necessary to clarify the content of the next parts.
Definition 1 (segments). For a, b ∈ N , the segment [a, b] is the set of agents defined by:
[a, b] =
{
{i ∈ N | a ≤ i ≤ b} if a ≤ b
{i ∈ N | a ≤ i or i ≤ b} if a > b.
Hence, a segment consists of a number of consecutive agents on the circle, irrespective of their
strategies.
Definition 2 (strings). For k ∈ N and strategy s ∈ S, a ks-string of the state x ∈ X is a
segment [a, b] such that the cardinality of [a, b] is equal to k, for every i ∈ [a, b], xi = s and if
k < n then xa−1 6= s and xb+1 6= s.
In other words, a ks-string consists of a locally maximal number of consecutive agents on the
circle who employ the same strategy in a particular iteration of the imitation process. Based
on Definition 2, the notation ≥ms-string is used as shorthand for ks-strings with k ≥ m. The
generic name s-string will be used for a ks-string of any length.
For a state x ∈ X, let p1(x) be the number of 1P -strings of x and p≥2(x) be the number
of ≥2P -strings of x. By analogy e2(x) is the number of 2E-strings of x, a≥2(x) is the number
of ≥2A-strings of x, etc. The notation a(x) = a≥1(x), e(x) = e≥1(x) and p(x) = p≥1(x) is
used as shorthand for the total number of A-strings, E-strings, and P -strings, respectively.
In the model of Eshel et al. (1998) all agents employ the strategies A and E and all
state transitions are deterministic. The following lemma presents one of their results, where
absorbing sets consisting of two states with deterministic transitions between them are called
blinkers.
Lemma 1 (Eshel et al., 1998). Let x, y ∈ X be such that, for every i ∈ N , xi ∈ {A,E} and
y ∈ F (x). The set {x, y} is a blinker if and only if: (i) e1(x) + e3(x) ≥ 1; (ii) for all k ≥ 4,
ek(x) = 0; (iii) in x the length of an A-string between any two consecutive E-strings is as
specified in Table 1.
If there is only one E-string in a blinker, then the number of A’s counted is the number of
A’s between one end of the E-string and the other. Note that no ≥4E-strings can exist in
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(E) (E,E) (E,E,E)
(E) ≥5A ≥4A ≥3A
(E,E) ≥3A ≥3A
(E,E,E) ≥3A
Table 1: Length of an A-string between E-strings of different lengths within blinkers. (Due
to symmetry only half of the table is filled.)
a blinker. Blinkers can only occur when n ≥ 6. An example of a blinker is presented in the
next subsection.
2.4 Two detailed examples
This section provides two examples. The first one constitutes a blinker and the second one
illustrates how, given the partial strategy, starting from a specific state more than one ab-
sorbing state can be reached.
First, consider the situation with n = 6 agents with the state being (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) =
(A,A,E,A,A,A). Consider y ∈ F (x). Since agent 1 adopts the A strategy and is surrounded
by neighbors also adopting the A strategy, he does not experience the use of any other
strategy and will continue to play the A strategy: y1 = A. The same applies to agents 5
and 6: y5 = y6 = A. Both agents 2 and 4 receive a payoff of 1 − 2c and observe one A
playing neighbor who receives a payoff of 2 − 2c and one E playing neighbor who receives a
payoff of 2. On average, they find the E strategy to be more rewarding than the A strategy
(2 > 3/2−2c) and both shift to the E strategy: y2 = y4 = E. Agent 3 sticks to the E strategy
as it yields a better payoff than the A strategies of his neighbors (2 > 1−2c): y3 = E. Hence,
as also illustrated in Table 2, after one iteration the state changes to (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) =
(A,E,E,E,A,A). From here, agents 3 and 6 stick to their strategies as they do not observe
any other strategy: z3 = E and z6 = A. Agents 1 and 5 stick to the A strategy, since
((1− 2c) + (2− 2c))/2 = 3/2− 2c > 1: z ∈ F (y) satisfies z1 = z5 = A. It is already clear that
the E strategy does not spread further, this being a consequence of the boundary A playing
agents observing an A player that is fully surrounded by A players. This underlines the
importance of having a sufficiently large string of A players in between the E-strings (Table 1).
Finally, agents 2 and 4 both observe agent 3 being very unsuccessful with the E strategy such
that on average the A strategy they observe is more productive ((1 + 0)/2 = 1/2 < 1 − 2c)
and this leads them back to it: z2 = z4 = A. The process is back at the starting state:
(z1, z2, z3, z4, z5, z6) = (A,A,E,A,A,A) = (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6).
Second, consider the situation with n = 4 agents with the state being (x1, x2, x3, x4) =
(A,P, P,E). In this state there are four possible realizations for the pair of P strategies:
d equals (A,R,R,E), (A,L,L,E), (A,L,R,E) or (A,R,L,E), each with equal probabil-
ity. These realizations induce a transition to the next state being (E,P,E,E), (P, P,E,E),
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Current state (x) Payoffs in current state (pi(d)) Next state (y)
(A,A,E,A,A,A) (2− 2c, 1− 2c, 2, 1− 2c, 2− 2c, 2− 2c) (A,E,E,E,A,A)
(A,E,E,E,A,A) (1− 2c, 1, 0, 1, 1− 2c, 2− 2c) (A,A,E,A,A,A)
Table 2: Example of a blinker. The two segments of the table comprise a blinker for the
smallest possible circle length for which blinkers can exist, n = 6.
(E,A,E,E) or (P, P, P,E), respectively; again, each with equal probability. While from states
(E,P,E,E) and (E,A,E,E) the process moves towards the absorbing state (E,E,E,E), from
the other two states further continuation of the process again depends on the realizations of
the P strategies. Table 3 presents the states that can be visited in the process starting from
state x. Figure 1 illustrates the full process of state transitions and shows that, in each of
these states the probability to reach the absorbing state (P, P, P, P ) equals 1/4, and that in
case the process does not move to this state it will ultimately end up in the egoistic absorb-
ing state. In short, given that the process starts in state x, it evolves to the absorbing state
(E,E,E,E) with probability 7/8 and to the absorbing state (P, P, P, P ) with probability 1/8.
This illustrates the possibility for the process to reach different absorbing states with different
payoff levels: in (P, P, P, P ) the average payoff is 1− c, while it equals 0 in (E,E,E,E).
Current state Prob. Current decisions Current payoffs Next state
(A,P, P,E) 1/4 (A,R,R,E) (−2c, 1− c, 1− c, 2) (E,P,E,E)a
1/4 (A,L,L,E) (1− 2c, 2− c,−c, 1) (P, P,E,E)
1/4 (A,L,R,E) (1− 2c, 1− c,−c, 2) (E,A,E,E)a
1/4 (A,R,L,E) (−2c, 2− c, 1− c, 1) (P, P, P,E)
(P, P,E,E) 1/4 (R,R,E,E) (−c, 1− c, 1, 0) (P,E, P,E)a
1/4 (L,L,E,E) (1− c,−c, 0, 1) (E,P,E, P )a
1/4 (L,R,E,E) (−c,−c, 1, 1) (E,E,E,E)
1/4 (R,L,E,E) (1− c, 1− c, 0, 0) (P, P, P, P )
(P, P, P,E) 1/8 (L,L,L,E) (1− c, 1− c,−c, 1) (E,P,E,E)a
1/8 (L,L,R,E) (1− c,−c,−c, 2) (E,P,E,E)a
1/8 (L,R,L,E) (−c, 1− c, 1− c, 1) (E,P,E,E)a
1/8 (R,L,L,E) (1− c, 2− c,−c, 0) (P, P, P, P )
1/8 (L,R,R,E) (−c,−c, 1− c, 2) (E,P,E,E)a
1/8 (R,R,L,E) (−c, 2− c, 1− c, 0) (P, P, P, P )
1/8 (R,L,R,E) (1− c, 1− c,−c, 1) (E,P,E,E)a
1/8 (R,R,R,E) (−c, 1− c, 1− c, 1) (E,P,E,E)a
Table 3: Example of the development of the process. It reaches two types of absorbing states,
given a specific starting state. The states marked with an a reach absorption in the following
period with probability 1.
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APPE EPEE
EAEE
PPEE
PPPE
PPPP
PEPE
EPEP
EEEE
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
4
1
43
4
1
1
1
1
Figure 1: Example of the development of the imitation dynamics starting from a state
(A,P, P,E) in the circle on the left and reaching one of two possible absorbing sets (in double
circles) within 2 or 3 iterations. The transition probabilities between the different states are
given above the arrows pointing in the direction of the transitions.
3 Theoretical results
This section describes the different absorbing sets that the process can reach. There are
two general types of absorbing sets that will be considered separately: stationary states
(singleton absorbing sets) and non-singleton absorbing sets. After characterizing the two
types of absorbing sets, the section continues with some further analytical observations.
Proposition 1. A state x ∈ X is a stationary state if and only if: (i) all agents play the
same strategy; or (ii) a≤2(x) = 0, a≥3(x) ≥ 1, e1(x) = 0, e2(x) ≥ 1, e≥3(x) = 0 and p(x) = 0.
Proof. Eshel et al. (1998) demonstrate that states consisting of only A’s, only E’s or states
which consist of 2E-strings and ≥3A-strings are stationary. Introducing the P strategy does
not affect this result. What is left to prove is that in the case of three possible strategies for
the agents, the only additional stationary state is the one where all agents play the strategy
P . In this case all agents are surrounded by the same strategy P and no agent will change
his strategy according to the na¨ıve imitation rule. Hence a state with only P strategies is
also a stationary state. It remains to be shown that there are no stationary states in which
some but not all players use strategy P .
Let x ∈ X be a state such that xi = P for some i ∈ N and at least one of his immediate
neighbors uses strategy A or E. Let y ∈ F (x) be a state reached from x in one iteration.
Case 3.1: (x1, x2) = (E,P )
Take d ∈ D(x) such that d2 = L. It follows that pi1(d) ≥ 1 and pi2(d) ∈ {−c, 1− c}. There are
three possibilities for the strategies of the third agent: (i) x3 = E: pi2(d) = −c and pi3(d) ≥ 0.
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(ii) x3 = P : pi3(d) ≤ 1 − c. (iii) x3 = A: pi3(d) ≤ 1 − 2c. For all possibilities it holds that
y2 = E 6= x2.
Case 3.2: (x1, x2) = (P,A)
For every d ∈ D(x), pi1(d) ≥ 1− c. Two subcases can be distinguished:
(i) x3 ∈ {E,P}: If d1 = L, then pi2(d) ≤ 1− 2c and pi3(d) ≥ 1− c, so x2 6= y2 ∈ {E,P}.
(ii) x3 = A: In case n = 3, y = (P, P, P ) for every d ∈ D(x). Next consider n ≥ 4. Two
cases are distinguished, since if d0 = E this is identical to Case 3.1(iii).
(a) d0 = L: Take d1 = R, then pi0(d), pi1(d) ≤ 1− c, pi2(d) = 2− 2c and y1 = A 6= x1.
(b) d0 ∈ {R,A}. It holds that pi1(d) = 2− c, pi2(d), pi3(d) ≤ 2− 2c and y2 = P 6= x2.
Therefore, with positive probability d ∈ D(x) is such that y(d) 6= x, so x is not a stationary
state.
To approach the non-singleton absorbing sets with the right tools, some terminology is in-
troduced in Definitions 3–8 below. The examples from the previous section will be used to
illustrate these definitions afterwards.
Definition 3 (splitting). For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, s ∈ {A,P,E} and a state x ∈ X that
transitions into a state y ∈ F (x), a ks-string [a, b] of x splits if at least one of the following
three conditions holds:
(i) for k ≥ 2, at least one of the following two conditions holds:
(a) yb−1 = yb+1 = s and yb 6= s;
(b) ya−1 = ya+1 = s and ya 6= s;
(ii) for k = 2, ya−1 = yb+1 = s, ya 6= s and yb 6= s;
(iii) for k = 1, ya−1 = ya+1 = s and ya 6= s.
Definition 4 (growing and shrinking).
(i) For k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}, s ∈ {A,P,E} and a state x ∈ X that transitions into a state
y ∈ F (x), a ks-string [a, b] of x grows if for every i ∈ [a, b], yi = s and (ya−1 = s or
yb+1 = s).
(ii) For k ∈ {2, 3, . . . , n− 1}, s ∈ {A,P,E} and a state x ∈ X that transitions into a state
y ∈ F (x), a ks-string [a, b] of x shrinks if ya−1 6= s, yb+1 6= s and (ya 6= s or yb 6= s).
Remark: Under the imitation process, if the whole circle is one ns-string it can neither grow
any further, nor can it shrink, because no agent will change his strategy.
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Definition 5 (disappearing). For k ∈ {1, 2}, s ∈ {A,P,E} and a state x ∈ X that transitions
into a state y ∈ F (x), a ks-string [a, b] of x disappears if for every i ∈ [a, b], yi 6= s and:
(i) if ya−1 = s, then ya−2 = s or (ii) if yb+1 = s, then yb+2 = s.
It is worth noting that if in Definition 5 ya−1 6= s and yb+1 6= s, then for every i ∈ [a−1, b+1],
yi 6= s.
The example with four agents in the previous section can illustrate the concepts that have
been introduced so far. For instance, between (A,P, P,E) and (E,P,E,E) the 2P -string
shrinks in length to a 1P -string; the 1E-string grows in length to a 3E-string; the 1A-string
disappears.
To analyze the absorbing sets of the imitation process, it is convenient to introduce a
pre-order on the set of states X. This motivates the following definition of improvement.
Definition 6 (improvement). For x, y ∈ X, state y improves upon x, denoted by y  x, if
one of the following two conditions holds:
(i) p(y) < p(x)
(ii) p(y) = p(x) and [pn(y), pn−1(y), . . . , p1(y)] >lex [pn(x), pn−1(x), . . . , p1(x)].
In other words, a state y ∈ X is an improvement upon a state x ∈ X if it has a smaller overall
number of P -strings or, if it has the same number of P -strings, then it has more longer P -
strings in a lexicographic sense. This is considered an improvement because it implies that
the state y is closer to an absorbing state with only P ’s or to an absorbing state with no
P ’s. Decisions of agents within a P -string which cause a specific P -string not to split will be
referred to as “no-splitting decisions”. These no-splitting decisions are provided explicitly by
means of Definition 7.
Definition 7 (no splitting). Take a state x ∈ X and i ∈ N . The no-splitting decision d∗i
of agent i at x is defined by:
(i) if i belongs to a 1P -string, then d∗i = R if xi−1 = E and xi+1 = A, and d
∗
i = L otherwise;
(ii) if i belongs to a ≥2P -string [a, b], then d∗i = R if i ∈ {a, b− 1}, and d∗i = L otherwise;
(iii) if xi ∈ {A,E}, then d∗i is trivially defined as d∗i = xi.
In other words, the no-splitting decisions for a 2P -string are (d∗1, d∗2) = (R,L); for 3P -strings
they are (d∗1, d∗2, d∗3) = (R,R,L), for 4P -strings they are (d∗1, d∗2, d∗3, d∗4) = (R,L,R,L), etc. The
next lemma states that the no-splitting decisions indeed result in no splitting of a specific
P -string.
Lemma 2. Let [a, a + k − 1] be a kP -string of the state x ∈ X, d ∈ D(x) be such that, for
every i ∈ [a, a+ k − 1], di = d∗i and y = f(d). Then [a, a+ k − 1] does not split.
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Proof. See Appendix.
If all agents take the no-splitting decision, then the number of P -strings does not increase
in the next iteration of the imitation process. Moreover, if a particular P -string disappears
whereas all agents outside the P -string take the no-splitting decision, then the number of
P -string has gone down in this iteration of the imitation process. To formalize this, the
additional notion of a P -section is needed.
Definition 8 (P -section). For x ∈ X, let P(x) = {[a1, b1], [a2, b2], . . . , [ar, br]} be the col-
lection of P -strings of x with a1 < a2 < . . . < ar and r = p(x). The set J ⊆ N is
called a P -section of size k ∈ {1, . . . , p(x)} of state x if there is q ∈ {1, . . . , r} such that
J = [aq − 1, bq+k−1 + 1].
Finally, for x ∈ X, p[a,b](x) is used to denote the number of P -strings intersecting the interval
[a, b].
Lemma 3 states that if all agents in a P -section take the no-splitting decision, then the
number of P -strings in this section will not go up.
Lemma 3. Let x ∈ X and J be a P -section of size k of the state x. Let d ∈ D(x) be such
that, for every j ∈ J , dj = d∗j . Then for y = f(d) it holds that pJ(y) ≤ pJ(x) = k. Moreover,
if k = p(x)− 1 and the P -string in N \ J disappears, then p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. By Lemma 2 it holds that none of the P -strings in J splits. The definition of splitting
implies that if [a, b] ⊂ J is a P -string of state x, then y has at most one P -string intersecting
the interval [a− 1, b+ 1]. It follows that pJ(y) ≤ pJ(x).
Assume k = p(x) − 1 and the P -string in N \ J, say [aq, bq], disappears. The result
follows immediately if yaq−1 6= P and ybq+1 6= P. If yaq−1 = P, then by the definition of
disappearing it holds that yaq−2 = P. Since [aq−1, bq−1] does not split, it follows that aq − 1
and aq − 2 are part of the unique P -string intersecting [aq−1 − 1, bq−1 + 1]. It follows that
p(y) = pJ(y) ≤ pJ(x) = p(x)− 1. A symmetric argument applies if ybq+1 = P.
The inequalities in Lemma 3 are strict if a P -string in J disappears or if two or more P -strings
in J merge.
The next lemma makes clear that at states where some but not all agents use strategy P,
it is always possible to find an improvement in a finite number of iterations.
Lemma 4. Let k ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1} be the cardinality of the longest P -string of state x ∈ X.
Then there is m ∈ {1, . . . , bk/2c+ 2} and y ∈ Fm(x) such that y  x.
Proof. Let [a, b] be any of the longest P -strings of x.
If k = 1 and xa−2, xa+2 ∈ {A,E}, then it holds by Lemma 5 in Appendix A.2 that there
is y ∈ F (x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a 2P -string or there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x)
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such that p(y) ≤ p(x)−1. Since [a, b] is one of the longest P -strings of x, it follows in all cases
that y  x.
If k = 1 and xa−2 = P or xa+2 = P, then it holds by Lemma 6 in Appendix A.2 that
there y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥ 2P -string or there is
y ∈ F (x)∪F 2(x)∪F 3(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)−1. Since [a, b] is one of the longest P -strings
of x, it follows in all cases that y  x.
If k = 2, then it holds by Lemma 7 in Appendix A.2 that there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such
that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥3P -string or there is y ∈ F (x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Since [a, b] is one of the longest P -strings of x, it follows in all cases that y  x.
If k = 3, then it holds by Lemma 8 in Appendix A.2 that there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x)
such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥4P -string or there is y ∈ F 2(x) ∪ F 3(x) such that
p(y) ≤ p(x) − 1. Since [a, b] is one of the longest P -strings of x, it follows in all cases that
y  x.
If k ≥ 4, then it holds by Lemma 9 in Appendix A.2 that there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) ∪
F 3(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥(k + 1)P -string or k is even and there is
y ∈ F k/2(x) ∪ F k/2+1(x) ∪ F k/2+2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) − 1 or k is odd and there is
y ∈ F (k+1)/2(x) ∪ F (k+3)/2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) − 1. Since [a, b] is one of the longest
P -strings of x, it follows in all cases that y  x.
The proofs of these lemmas involve constructing explicit paths to improvement for every
possible case; that is, all P -strings of the initial state are traced to eventual disappearance
or growth (also through merging with other P -strings) so that after a number of iterations
the state has either only P ’s or no P ’s at all. Proposition 2 then concludes that the only
non-singleton absorbing sets of the model are the ones in Lemma 1.
Proposition 2. A set of states is a non-singleton absorbing set if and only if it is a blinker
as presented in Lemma 1.
Proof. Let x ∈ X be any state which contains the strategy P and at least one other strategy.
By Lemma 4 there exists m1 ∈ N and y ∈ Fm1(x) such that y  x. Either y contains no
P ’s at all, after which the results follow from Eshel et al. (1998), or y is a stationary state
with only P ’s (Proposition 1), or we can apply Lemma 4 again and there exists m2 ∈ N and
z ∈ Fm2(y) such that z  y. Since the set of states is finite and  is a pre-order, we reach
a state that contains no P ’s at all or a stationary state with only P ’s in a finite number of
steps.
The section concludes with a few analytical results, complementing the simulations in the
following section. The aim of these results is to show the relative advantage some strategies
have over others under specific circumstances. The first series of observations deals with three
specific structures of states, consisting of only 1s-strings, for s ∈ {A,P,E}:
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(i) Let n ≥ 4 be even and let x be such that all odd agents take the same strategy A and
all even agents take strategy P . Then, all strategy A agents will adopt strategy P and
all strategy P agents will continue playing P .
(ii) Let n ≥ 4 be even and let x be such that all odd agents take the same strategy E and
all even agents take strategy P . Then, all strategy P agents will adopt strategy E and
all strategy E agents will continue playing E.
(iii) Let n ≥ 3 be divisible by three and let x be such that players alternately play A, P
and E (i.e., x = · · ·APEAPE · · · ). Then, all agents will adopt strategy E in the next
period.
The second series of observations deals with longer strings and concerns what happens at the
borders of these strings, via two cases: one where a P -string meets an A-string (Case 3.3)
and one where a P -string meets an E-string (Case 3.4).
Case 3.3: n ≥ 4 and (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (P, P,A,A)
Let d ∈ D(x) and y = f(d). If (d1, d2) = (R,R), then (y2, y3) = (A,P ). If (d1, d2) = (R,L),
then (y2, y3) = (P, P ). If (d1, d2) = (L,R), then (y2, y3) = (A,A). If (d1, d2) = (L,L), then
(y2, y3) ∈ {(P,A), (P, P )}.
Case 3.4: n ≥ 4 and (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (P, P,E,E)
Let d ∈ D(x) and y = f(d). If (d1, d2) = (R,R), then (y2, y3) ∈ {(E,P ), (E,E)}. If (d1, d2) =
(R,L), then (y2, y3) = (P, P ). If (d1, d2) = (L,R), then (y2, y3) = (E,E). If (d1, d2) = (L,L),
then (y2, y3) = (P,E).
While this is certainly not an exhaustive list of all possibilities, some trends can be ob-
served, such as: when A’s are pitted against the P ’s the P strategy is more likely to propagate
((i) and Case 3.3). In contrast, when P ’s are facing E’s, the E’s are more likely to take over
((ii) and Case 3.4). Finally, Eshel et al. (1998) show that many clustered A’s can limit the
E’s to small pockets of length 2 on average. This gives a general “rock-paper-scissors” over-
arching structure of the setup in which any of the strategies can be defeated by one of the
other strategies. This broad observation proves to be important when analysing the computer
simulations in the next section.
4 Simulation results
This section presents the results from the computer simulations of the model. Several char-
acteristics of the initial states have been investigated to establish which of them influence the
probability of a particular absorbing set being reached. Every simulation run started with
selecting an initial state based on specific parameters, including the length of the circle n,
the probability of using the P strategy and the probability of segregation for the strategies.
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Next, the decision rule was implemented until absorption was reached. For every choice of
parameters the model has been simulated 10,000 times. The graphs in this section plot the
averages of the specific outcome variables over these 10,000 runs. The situation where initially
each agent plays one of the three strategies by uniform random choice is used as default and
applies unless otherwise stated.
4.1 Varying the probability the agents start with the P strategy
Let ρ denote the probability by which agents use strategy P in the starting state. In the
default case this probability is 1/3. In the extreme case when ρ = 0 the setup is equivalent
to the model by Eshel et al. (1998) and only A and E strategies appear in the starting state.
Four other intermediate options are considered: ρ ∈ {1/6, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6}. In all cases the
probabilities for A and E in the initial state were kept equal to each other.
Absorbing sets Figure 2 presents the frequencies with which every possible absorbing set is
reached. It is immediately obvious that the probability that an only A stationary state appears
decreases sharply when n increases (top-left graph). This is due to the fact that, apart from
starting at this absorbing state, it can only be reached if first all E’s disappear after which the
remaining P ’s are driven out by the A’s. However, the probability for this development is very
low because strategy A does worse on average when pitted against strategy P . The percentage
of A/E absorbing sets increases steadily as n increases for any value of ρ (top-right graph).
This happens at the expense of the E stationary states, which follow the opposite pattern.
The A/E absorbing sets are negatively affected by an increased presence of the P strategy,
while the E’s benefit from that (bottom-left graph). At first glance it is unexpected that the
P stationary state is not positively influenced by more P ’s in the initial state (bottom-right
graph). However, this can be explained by them being taken over by E’s. It is interesting
to note that increasing ρ also increases the probability of ending in a P stationary state only
for small n, while for bigger n increasing ρ works in the same way only up to about ρ = 1/2.
After that, increasing ρ further clearly decreases the probability of ending in a P absorbing
state, which is consistent with the explanation above. On a bigger circle, the chances that
some E-string succeeds overturning the P ’s get bigger.
Times to absorption Figure 3 presents the absorption times for the process in general
and conditional on a specific absorbing set being reached. Even the sets which take most
iterations to reach do not require a number of iterations that exceeds 2.5 times the length
of the circle. The disparate patterns of the absorption times are due to the various ways in
which different absorbing states are generally reached. To get to an A/E set, all P ’s have to
disappear. While in general the P ’s could help eliminate all E strategies, leaving even one
E before the P ’s themselves are removed suffices to reach an A/E set. Absorbing to a state
containing only P ’s always takes the most iterations, because P -strings can fluctuate between
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Figure 2: Percentages of specific absorbing sets resulting for different numbers of agents,
varying the probability of agents starting with the P strategy.
growing and shrinking much longer when surrounded by A- or E-strings than strings of any
of the two other strategies can when pitted against each other. Figure 3 does not feature
absorbing times to A states because they are increasingly rare as an occurrence and therefore
susceptible to greater influence of outlier absorption times (see top-left graph of Figure 2).
It is noteworthy that even for higher values of ρ the average absorption times are almost
linear. Having more P ’s at the outset causes absorption to A/E states to take increasingly
longer (top-right), while the opposite effect is observed in the absorption to the E stationary
state (bottom-left).4 This is consistent with P ’s impeding the A’s from spreading fast, while
being conducive to the spread of E’s.
4The flat line for ρ = 0 in the graph for absorption to E states (bottom-left) is due to the fact that when
there are no P ’s, the setup is very similar to the neat example in the previous section and this explains the short
absorption times of about 1–2 iterations. The line corresponding to the ρ = 1/6 in the same graph behaves
somewhat erratically at first glance. However, this is due to the fact that there are very few observations in
this range.
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Figure 3: Average number of iterations to absorption to any absorbing state (top-left), to
A/E states (top-right), to E states (bottom-left), and to P states (bottom-right).
Strategies in the absorbing sets Figure 4 presents the collapsed results from Figure 2
divided by the three strategies rather than by absorbing sets. The results for the A-strategy
are quite intuitive because, given the relative advantage that the P strategy has over the A
strategy, increasing the overall number of P ’s in the initial state naturally leads to fewer A’s
in the absorbing states. Nevertheless, a circle with a higher number of agents always increases
the probability that the altruists will increase in number in the absorbing states. The reverse
of this is apparent for the P -strategy. The initially surprising dip as the number of P ’s in
the initial states increases can be explained by the fact that small numbers of P strategies,
even if densely distributed, can easily be overpowered by neighboring E’s. This explanation
is corroborated by the data presented for the E-strategy, showing that E’s thrive when the
initial number of P ’s increases. The downward trend in the number of E’s in absorbing states
as n increases can therefore be explained by a prevalence of the effect of increasing the number
of agents. This is due to the fact that on a larger circle a string of E’s has a higher chance of
colliding with a ≥3A-string, in which case the E’s inevitably shrink.
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Figure 4: Percentages of specific strategies in the absorbing states resulting for different
numbers of agents, varying the probability of agents starting with the P strategy.
Efficiency The left graph in Figure 5 presents the average numbers of altruist acts as a
proportion of the possible maximum number of altruist acts in the absorbing states. Each
agent can employ two altruistic acts: one for each of the two neighbors. Strategy A counts
for two altruist acts, strategy P for one, and strategy E for zero. Since this number reflects
the total value that is created in absorbing states, it measures efficiency.
Within the current setup the average percentage of altruist acts in the starting state equals
50% for all values of ρ. The graph shows that while efficiency improves with a bigger number
of agents on the circle, the increased prevalence of the P strategy in the starting state actually
counters this effect. However, in states in which A and E coexist, P marginally decreases the
number of free-riding E’s (right graph). This happens because P is the strategy which can
fully dispose of E’s. In the model with only A and E strategies the A’s can only significantly
shrink long strings of E’s, but once there is an E strategy in the initial state it can never
fully disappear, i.e., it can never absorb to a stationary state of only A’s.
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Figure 5: Efficiency as measured by the number of altruist acts (left) and percentage of E
strategies within A/E absorbing sets (right).
4.2 Development of the process
Using the data gathered over 10,000 simulation runs for a network with n = 99 agents
under default starting conditions for the strategies, the left graph of Figure 6 presents the
development of the distribution over strategies used by the agents throughout the process
from start to absorption, irrespective of the particular absorbing set that is reached. Note
that in order to disentangle short-run, medium-run and long-run effects, the iterations on
the x-axis follow a square root scale. By default, in the starting state all three strategies
have an equal probability of occurrence. The graph ends at the 469-th iteration, when the
longest simulation run reached absorption. Information on the absorbing states that were
reached earlier is taken into account when deriving the percentages at later iterations. The
distribution of absorption times in the right graph explains the overall smoothness after the
200-th iteration, with very few simulations reaching absorption after this number of iterations.
A striking feature of the distribution over strategies presented in the left graph is the
sharp decrease in A and P strategies in the first few periods. Strategy A suffers a great
loss in numbers from the first to the second iteration, which is consistent with strategy E
replacing A and on occasion reaching an all-E absorbing state when the A’s are not clustered.
After segregated groups of A’s have been formed they are able to overpower the E’s, after
which only small highly resistant pockets of E’s are left within lengthy A-strings. At this
point the relatively dormant P ’s that are left in states which have not reached absorption
can take advantage of the A’s. This development is also suggested by the distribution over
absorption times (right graph), which exhibits peaks at roughly the average absorption times
for the three strategies as suggested by Figure 3, namely at around period 40 for A/E sets,
around 50 for E states and around 200 for P states.
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Figure 6: The left graph presents the development of the distribution over strategies used by
the agents throughout the process from start to absorption. The right graph presents for each
iteration the probability of absorption. Both graphs are based on n = 99 agents and 10,000
simulation runs.
4.3 Varying the probability of segregation
One of the characteristics used to analyze the initial states and how they influence the proba-
bility of reaching a particular absorbing set is the index of segregation introduced by Ballester
and Vorsatz (2014). This measure, defined for general networks, captures the likelihood that
a node of a certain type (in this case, the agent holding a particular strategy) ends his random
walk along the links of the network at a node of the same type (in this case, an agent holding
the same strategy), where the walk could be terminated at every step with an exogenously
given probability.5
A gradual increase in the probability of segregation of all three strategies is simulated
by increasing the probability (denoted here by α) that an agent with one strategy would be
followed by an agent with the same strategy when constructing the starting state. That is,
after the first agent is seeded with one of the strategies, every following agent is assigned the
same strategy as the previous agent with probability α and each of the other strategies with
probability 12(1 − α). The value of α is varied between α = 0 (i.e., agents with the same
strategy cannot be next to each other, except possibly the first and last agent) to α = 5/6 in
steps of 1/6. Figure 7 presents the distributions over strategies in the absorbing state when
designing the starting state as just described, for the various values of α.
The figure shows that that increasing the probability of segregation increases the chances
of the P strategy to take over the circle and overall decreases this probability for the E
strategy. This can be explained by clusters of A’s predictably overpowering the E’s after
5In the simple setting of this model, counting the number of >1-strings of different strategies in the starting
state gives similar indications to the index of segregation about the probability that a certain absorbing state
is reached.
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Figure 7: Strategies in the absorbing state varying the segregation probability (n = 60).
which they give in to the P ’s. For α = 5/6 this effect is offset by the fact that too many
P ’s are susceptible to free-riding by the E’s. The effect for the A strategy is more complex
in the sense that if too scattered, the A’s cannot benefit from cooperating with each other,
while if they are too clustered, they could be taken over by the P ’s, leaving the circle more
vulnerable to the E’s.
5 Conclusion
This paper presents a local interaction model where agents on a circle use a na¨ıve imitation
decision rule, by adopting in each following period the strategy that has provided the highest
average payoff from the ones in their observed neighborhood in the current period. The
new element in this model is its relative departure from the dichotomous “altruist/egoist”
framework that is frequently implemented to study cooperation by introducing a partially
altruistic strategy. It allows a middle option between the two extremes, giving the agents
the option to cooperate with only one of their neighbors. This feature gives the model a
“rock-paper-scissors” flavor, whereby every strategy’s propagation is inhibited by one other
strategy and propped up by the third one.
The absorbing sets of the Markov process resulting from the imitation dynamic are theo-
retically characterized and further analyzed by means of computer simulations. The partially
cooperative strategy does not coexist with the other two strategies in any absorbing states.
The introduction of the partially cooperative strategy has interesting consequences for the
development of the process: it hinders the propagation of the altruist strategy and enables
the spread of the egoists, and this effect is much stronger than the influence it has on its own
diffusion in the population.
On average, the process of reaching absorption could be divided into several phases.
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Firstly, there is a swift elimination of isolated altruists, which solidifies them in bigger blocks.
Secondly, they slowly start gaining ground at the expense of big neighboring clusters of ego-
ists. Once this stage is completed, the remaining groups of agents with the partial strategy
slowly take over the remaining non-absorbed altruists.
Finally, somewhat contrary to the usual conditions for sustaining altruism, where clusters
of altruists in a local interaction model are generally seen as favoring altruism, this model
suggests that while it is true that very isolated altruists cannot survive, if they are in too big
groups at the beginning of the process, this would benefit the partial strategy and in time
even enable the egoists.
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A Proofs
To ease the notation, pi denotes pi(d) throughout the Appendix.
A.1 No splitting of P -strings
Lemma 2. Let [a, a+ k− 1] be a kP -string of the state x ∈ X, d ∈ D(x) such that, for every
i ∈ [a, a+ k − 1], di = d∗i and y = f(d). Then [a, a+ k − 1] does not split.
Proof. First consider the case k = 1. Without loss of generality, let x ∈ X be such that a = 2,
so x2 = P and x1, x3 6= P . The statement of the lemma is true if one of the following two
cases occurs:
(i) y2 = P.
(ii) y2 6= P and (y1 6= P or y3 6= P ).
Up to symmetries, Cases A.1–A.3 cover all possible segments of 3 agents that contain a
1P -string.
Case A.1: (x1, x2, x3) = (A,P,A)
It holds that d∗2 = L, pi1 ≤ 2− 2c, pi2 = 2− c and pi3 ≤ 1− 2c, so y2 = P.
Case A.2: (x1, x2, x3) = (E,P,E)
It holds that d∗2 = L, pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −c and pi3 ≥ 0, so y1 6= P and y2 = E.
Case A.3: (x1, x2, x3) = (A,P,E)
It holds that d∗2 = L, pi1 ∈ {1 − 2c, 2 − 2c}, pi2 = 1 − c and pi3 ∈ {0, 1}. Three cases can be
distinguished:
(i) pi1 = 1− 2c and pi3 = 0: y2 = P.
(ii) pi1 = 1− 2c and pi3 = 1: y2 = E and d4 ∈ {A,L}. It follows that pi4 ≤ 1− c and y3 = E.
(iii) pi1 = 2 − 2c and pi3 ∈ {0, 1}: y2 = A and d0 ∈ {A,R}. It follows that pi0 ≥ 1 − 2c and
y1 = A.
Next, consider the cases k 6= 1, 3. Without loss of generality, let x ∈ X be such that a = 2,
so x1 6= P, x2 = · · · = xk+1 = P and xk+2 6= P. Then, y2 = P or (y2 6= P and y1 6= P ). The
same argument can be used to show that yk+1 = P or (yk+1 6= P and yk+2 6= P ). It holds
that d∗2 = R, d∗3 = L, pi2 ≥ 1 − c and pi3 ≥ 1 − c. If x1 = A, then pi1 ≤ 1 − 2c, so y2 = P.
Assume x1 = E and y2 6= P. It follows that pi1 = 1, so y1 = E.
Finally, consider the case k = 3. Without loss of generality, let x ∈ X be such that a = 2,
so x1 6= P, x2 = x3 = x4 = P and x5 6= P. It holds that d∗2 = R, d∗3 = R, and d∗4 = L.
Since d∗3 = R and d∗4 = L, the conclusion that y4 = P or (y4 6= P and y5 6= P ) follows as for
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the case k 6= 1, 3. It suffices to show that y2 = P or (y2 6= P and y1 6= P ). If x1 = A, then
pi1 ≤ 1− 2c, pi2 = 1− c and pi3 = 2− c, so y2 = P. Assume x1 = E and y2 6= P. Since pi2 = −c
and pi3 = 2− c, y2 6= P implies pi1 = 1. It then follows that y1 6= P.
A.2 1P -strings
Let {a} be a 1P -string of the state x ∈ X, so agents a − 1 and a + 1 do not use strategy P.
In case also agents a− 2 and a+ 2 do not use strategy P, we call the segment [a− 2, a+ 2] a
1P -segment. Lemma 5 deals with this situation.
Lemma 5. Let {a} be a 1P -string within a 1P -segment of the state x ∈ X. Then one of the
following two cases occurs:
(i) there is y ∈ F (x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a 2P -string;
(ii) there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. Table 4 lists all possible 1P -segments, omitting symmetric equivalent possibilities.
Cases A.4–A.8 below cover all these possible 1P -segments and the table makes clear which
possibilities are covered by which of these cases. Moreover, the table makes explicit for each
possible 1P -segment what can happen to the 1P -string in this segment. The development of
the 1P -segments is illustrated in Figure 8.
Case A.4: (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (A,A, P,A)
Take d3 = L, for i 6= 3, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 2− 2c, pi2 = 2− 2c, pi3 = 2− c and
pi4 ≤ 1− 2c, so (y2, y3) = (P, P ) and the 1P -string {3} grows. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.5: (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (E,E, P,E)
Take d3 = R, for i 6= 3, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 0, pi2 = 0, pi3 = −c, pi4 ∈ {1, 2}
and pi5 < 1 if x5 6= E and pi5 ∈ {0, 1} if x5 = E. In any case (y2, y3, y4) = (E,E,E) and the
1P -string {3} disappears. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Case A.6: (x1, x2, x3) = (A,E, P )
Take d3 = R, for i 6= 3, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1− 2c and pi2 = 1.
(i) (x4, x5) = (A,A): then pi3 = 1−c, pi4 = 2−2c and pi5 ≥ 1−2c, so (y2, y3, y4) = (E,A,A).
(ii) (x4, x5) = (A,E): then pi3 = 1− c, pi4 = 1− 2c and pi5 ≥ 1, so (y2, y3, y4) = (E,E,E).
(iii) x4 = E: then pi3 = −c, pi4 ≥ 1 and pi5 ≤ 1, so (y2, y3, y4) = (E,E,E).
In all three subcases above the 1P -string {3} disappears. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Case A.7: (x1, x2, x3) = (E,A, P )
Take d3 = L, for i 6= 3, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi0 ≤ 1, pi1 ≥ 1 and pi2 = 1− 2c.
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(i) (x4, x5) = (A,E): then pi3 = 2−c, pi4 = −2c, pi5 ≥ 1 and pi6 ≤ 1, so y1 6= P, y2 ∈ {P,E},
y3 = P , y4 ∈ {P,E} and y5 = E. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Either the 1P -string
{3} grows or [1, 5] is a 1P -segment of y that satisfies the conditions of Case A.5, so there
is z ∈ F (y) such that the 1P -string {3} disappears and p(z) ≤ p(y)− 1.
(ii) (x4, x5) = (E,E): then pi3 = 1 − c, pi4 = 0 and pi5 ≤ 1, so (y2, y3, y4) = (E,P, P ) and
the 1P -string {3} grows. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.8: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,A, P,E,E)
Take d3 = R, for i 6= 3, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ∈ {1 − 2c, 2 − 2c}, pi2 = 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 1− c, pi4 = 1 and pi5 ∈ {0, 1}. It is useful to distinguish a few cases here:
(i) pi1 = 1 − 2c: then d0 ∈ {E,L}, so pi0 ≥ 1 − c and y1 ∈ {E,P}, (y2, y3) = (P,E) and
(y4, y5) ∈ {(E,E), (P, P ), (P,E)}.
If (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P,E, P, P ), then the 1P -string {3} disappears and it follows
by Lemma 3 that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
If (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,P,E, P, P ), then it holds by Lemma 3 that p(y) ≤ p(x). We
can proceed as in Case A.5. Take d′2 = L and, for i 6= 2, d′i = d∗i . For z = f(d′) it
holds that (z1, z2, z3, z4) = (E,E, P, P ), so the 1P -string {2} disappears and it follows
by Lemma 3 that p(z) ≤ p(y) − 1. The case (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P,E, P,E) follows
by a symmetric argument.
If (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,P,E, P,E), then it holds by Lemma 3 that p(y) ≤ p(x) + 1.
The construction that follows is also used in Case A.10. Take d′2 = L, d′4 = R, and, for
i 6= 2, 4, d′i = d∗i . For z = f(d′) it holds that (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) = (E,E,E,E,E), so the
1P -strings {2} and {4} disappear and by Lemma 3 it holds that p(z) ≤ p(y)− 2.
If (y1, y2, y3, y4) = (E,P,E,E), then it follows by Lemma 3 that p(y) ≤ p(x). Since
x1 = x2 6= E, we have x0 = E, pi0 ≥ 1, and y0 6= P. Now Case A.5 applies and there is
z ∈ F (y) such that the 1P -string {2} disappears and p(z) ≤ p(y)− 1.
(ii) pi1 = 2− 2c, pi5 = 0: then (y2, y3, y4) = (A,E, P ), y5 ∈ {P,E}. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤
p(x). Either the 1P -string {3} grows or (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (A,E, P,E). We can proceed as
in Case A.6. Take d′4 = R, for i 6= 4, di = d∗i , and z = f(d′). It holds that pi2(d′) ≤ 1−2c,
pi3(d
′) = 1, pi4(d′) = −c, pi5(d′) ≥ 1 and pi6(d′) ≤ 1, so (z3, z4, z5) = (E,E,E) and the
1P -string {4} disappears. Lemma 3 implies p(z) ≤ p(y)− 1.
(iii) pi1 = 2 − 2c, pi5 = 1: then (y2, y3, y4) = (A,E,E). The 1P -string {3} disappears and
Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Let {a} and {b} be 1P -strings of the state x ∈ X, where b = a + 2. We call the segment
[a − 1, b + 1] a 1P +1P -segment. Notice that xa+1 = xb−1 6= P. Lemma 6 deals with this
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Case Segment (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) Decision d3 Results
A.4 (A,A, P,A,A) L ≥2P
A.4 (A,A, P,A,E) L ≥2P
A.6 (A,A, P,E,A) L 0P
A.8 (A,A, P,E,E) R 0P ; ≥2P
A.6 (A,E, P,A,E) R 0P
A.6 (A,E, P,E,A) R 0P
A.5 (A,E, P,E,E) L 0P
A.7 (E,A, P,A,E) L 0P ; ≥2P
A.7 (E,A, P,E,E) L ≥2P
A.5 (E,E, P,E,E) R 0P
Table 4: All possible 1P -segments, omitting symmetric equivalent possibilities, and what can
happen with the 1P -string within the segment.
situation. The case where a 1P -string does not border another 1P -string, but does border a
≥2P -string from at least one side (i.e. there is exactly one agent between the 1P -string and a
neighboring ≥2P -string, is addressed in Appendices A.3–A.5, where ≥2P -strings are studied.
Lemma 6. Let {a} and {b} be 1P -strings within a 1P+1P -segment of the state x ∈ X. Then
one of the following two cases occurs:
(i) there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥2P -string;
(ii) there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) ∪ F 3(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. Table 5 lists all possible 1P+1P -segments, omitting symmetric equivalent possibilities.
Cases A.9–A.13 below cover all these possible 1P +1P -segments and the table makes clear
which possibilities are covered by which of these cases. Moreover, the table makes explicit
for each possible 1P+1P -segment what can happen to the 1P -strings in this segment. The
development of the 1P+1P -segments is illustrated in Figure 8.
Case A.9: (x1, x2, x3, x4) = (A,P,A, P )
Take d2 = L, d4 = R, for i 6= 2, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c, pi2 = 2 − c,
pi3 = −2c and pi4 ≥ 1− c, so (y2, y3) = (P, P ) and the 1P -string {2} grows. Lemma 3 implies
p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.10: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (E,P,E, P,E)
Take d2 = L, d4 = R, for i 6= 2, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1, pi5 ≥ 1, pi2 = pi4 = −c
and pi3 = 0, so (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,E,E,E,E) and the 1P -strings {2} and {4} disappear.
Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 2.
Case A.11: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P,E, P,E)
Take d2 = L, d4 = R, for i 6= 2, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi2 = 1 − c, pi3 = 0, pi4 = −c
and pi5 ≥ 1.
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(i) pi1 = 1− 2c: then (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P,E,E). The 1P -string {2} grows and Lemma 3
implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
(ii) pi1 = 2−2c: then (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) = (A,A, P,E,E). Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)−1.6
Case A.12: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P,E, P,A)
Take d2 = L, d4 = R, for i 6= 2, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ∈ {1−2c, 2−2c}, pi2 = 1−c,
pi3 = 0, pi4 = 1− c and pi5 ∈ {1− 2c, 2− 2c}. We consider the following cases concerning pi5
(bearing in mind that the cases for pi1 are symmetric):
(i) pi5 = 1− 2c: then d6 ∈ {R,E}, (y3, y4) = (P, P ), y5 ∈ {P,E}.
(ii) pi5 = 2− 2c: then d6 ∈ {A,L}, (y3, y4, y5) = (P,A,A).
Keeping the symmetric structure in mind, the segment results in a ≥ 2P -string and, by
Lemma 3, p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1, or a 1P -segment and, by Lemma 3, p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.7
Case A.13: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = (E,P,A, P,E)
Take d2 = L, d4 = L, for i 6= 2, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ∈ {1, 2}, pi2 = 1 − c,
pi3 = 1− 2c, pi4 = 1− c and pi5 ∈ {0, 1}. It holds that y1 ∈ {P,E} and (y2, y3) = (E,P ).
If pi5 = 0, then d6 ∈ {E,R} and pi6 ≤ 1, so (y4, y5) = (P, P ). The 1P -string {4} grows and
Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
If pi5 = 1, then d6 ∈ {A,L} and pi6 ≤ 1−c, so (y4, y5) = (E,E). Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
We can proceed as in Case A.5. Take d′2 = L and, for i 6= 2, d′i = d∗i . For z = f(d′) it
holds that (z2, z3, z4) = (E,E,E), so the 1P -string {3} disappears and Lemma 3 implies
p(z) ≤ p(y)− 1.
Case Segment (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) Decisions d2, d4 Results
A.9 (A,P,A, P,A) L,R ≥2P
A.9 (A,P,A, P,E) L,R ≥2P
A.12 (A,P,E, P,A) L,R ≥2P
A.11 (A,P,E, P,E) L,R 0P ; ≥2P
A.13 (E,P,A, P,E) L,L 0P ; ≥2P
A.10 (E,P,E, P,E) L,R 0P
Table 5: All possible 1P+1P -segments, omitting symmetric equivalent possibilities.
A.3 2P -strings
Lemma 7. Let [a, a + 1] be a 2P -string of the state x ∈ X. Then one of the following two
cases occurs:
6From y we can continue as in Case A.8 and find a state such that the 1P -string {3} disappears or grows.
7Now Case A.4 applies, leading to a ≥2P -string in the next iteration.
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Figure 8: Transforming 1P -segments and 1P+1P -segments based on the cases specified in
the squares results in the P -strings in the circles.
(i) there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥3p-string;
(ii) there is y ∈ F (x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. Cases A.14–A.23 below cover all these possible 2P -strings. Table 6 lists all possible
cases and makes explicit for each case what can happen to the 2P -strings. The development
of the 2P -strings is illustrated in Figure 9.
Case A.14: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,A) and d∗6 ∈ {A,R,L}
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c, pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 2 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 ≤ 1 − 2c and pi6 ≥ 1 − 2c and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P, P ).
The 2P -string [3, 4] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.15: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,A) and d∗6 = E
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c, pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 2 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = −2c and pi6 ≥ 1 and hence (y2, y3, y4) = (P, P, P ), (y5, y6) ∈
{(P,E), (E,E)}. The 2P -string [3, 4] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.16: d∗1 ∈ {E,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (E,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1, pi2 = 0, pi3 = 1 − c,
pi4 = 1 − c, pi5 = 0 and pi6 ≤ 1 and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P, P ). The 2P -string [3, 4]
grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.17: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,A) and d∗6 = E
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −2c, pi3 = 2− c,
pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = −2c and pi6 ≥ 1 and hence (y1, y2) ∈ {(E,P ), (E,E)}, (y3, y4) = (P, P )
and (y5, y6) ∈ {(P,E), (E,E)}. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). If (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) 6=
(E,E, P, P,E,E), then the 2P -string [3, 4] grows. Otherwise, we can apply Case A.16 and
find z ∈ F (y) such that p(z) ≤ p(y) and the 2P -string [3, 4] grows.
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Case A.18: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c, pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 2 − c, pi4 = 1 − c, pi5 = 0 and pi6 ≤ 1 and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P, P ). The
2P -string [3, 4] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.19: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −2c, pi3 = 2− c,
pi4 = 1−c, pi5 = 0 and pi6 ≤ 1 and hence (y1, y2) ∈ {(E,P ), (E,E)} and (y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P ).
The 2P -string [3, 4] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.20: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4) = (R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c, pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 2 − c, pi4 = 1 − c, pi5 = 1 and pi6 ≤ 1 − c and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P,E). The
2P -string [3, 4] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.21: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (A,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4) = (L,R), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = 1 − 2c,
pi3 = 1− c, pi4 = −c, pi5 = 2 and pi6 ≤ 1− 2c and (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,A,E,E). The 2P -string
[3, 4] disappears and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Case A.22: d∗1 ∈ {E,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (E,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4) = (L,R), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1, pi2 = 1, pi3 = −c,
pi4 = −c, pi5 = 2 and pi6 ≤ 1 − c and (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,E,E,E). The 2P -string [3, 4]
disappears and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Case A.23: d∗1 ∈ {A,R}, (x2, x3, x4, x5) = (E,P, P,E) and d∗6 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4) = (L,R), for i 6= 3, 4, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1− c, pi2 = 2, pi3 = −c,
pi4 = −c, pi5 = 2, pi6 ≤ 1−c and (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,E,E,E). The 2P -string [3, 4] disappears
and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
(x3, x4) = (P, P ) (d
∗
5, d
∗
6) =
(A,A/R/L) (A,E) (E,E/R) (E,A/L)
(d
∗ 1,
d
∗ 2)
= (A/R/L,A) g (A.14) g (A.15) g (A.18) g (A.20)
(E,A) g (A.17) g (A.19) d (A.21)
(E/L,E) g (A.16) d (A.22)
(A/R,E) d (A.23)
Table 6: Strings resulting from 2P -strings surrounded from the left by the decisions in the
columns and from the right by the decisions in the rows. Abbreviations ‘g’ and ‘d’ in the cells
are used to identify whether the P -string will be growing or disappearing. Relevant cases are
in parentheses.
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≥3P
A.14
A.15
A.20A.19
A.17A.16A.18
A.21
A.22
A.23
0P
Figure 9: Transforming 2P -strings based on the cases specified in the squares results in the
P -strings in the circles.
A.4 3P -strings
Lemma 8. Let n ≥ 4 and let [a, a + 2] be a 3P -string of the state x ∈ X. Then one of the
following two cases occurs:
(i) there is y ∈ F (x) ∪ F 2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥4P -string;
(ii) there is y ∈ F 2(x) ∪ F 3(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. Cases A.24–A.33 describe all possible 3P -strings. Table 7 lists all possible cases and
makes explicit for each possibility what can happen to the 3P -strings. The development of
the 3P -strings is illustrated in Figure 10.
Case A.24: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,A) and d∗7 ∈ {A,R,L}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c,
pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c, pi3 = 1 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 2 − c, pi6 ≤ 1 − 2c and pi7 ≥ 1 − 2c and hence
(y3, y4, y5, y6) = (P, P, P, P ). The 3P -string [3, 5] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.25: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,A) and d∗7 = E
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,L,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c,
pi2 ≤ 1 − 2c, pi3 = 2 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 1 − c, pi6 = −2c and pi7 ≥ 1 and hence
(y2, y3, y4, y5) = (P, P, P, P ). The 3P -string [3, 5] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.26: d∗1 ∈ {E,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (E,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1, pi2 = 0,
pi3 = −c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 1 − c, pi6 = 0 and pi7 ≤ 1 and hence (y3, y4, y5, y6) = (P, P, P, P ).
The 3P -string [3, 5] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.27: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,A) and d∗7 = E
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −2c,
pi3 = 1 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 2 − c, pi6 = −2c and pi7 ≥ 1 and hence (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5) =
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(E,E, P, P, P ), y6 ∈ {P,E} and y7 = E. Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). If (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7) =
(E,E, P, P, P, P,E), then the 3P -string [3, 5] grows. Otherwise, (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7) =
(E,E, P, P, P,E,E) and Case A.26 implies that we can find z ∈ F (y) such that p(z) ≤ p(y)
and the 3P -string [3, 5] grows.
Case A.28: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,L,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c,
pi2 ≤ 1− 2c, pi3 = 2− c, pi4 = 2− c, pi5 = −c, pi6 = 0 and pi7 ≤ 1 and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) =
(P, P, P, P ). The 3P -string [3, 5] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.29: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {E,R}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −2c,
pi3 = 1 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 1 − c, pi6 = 0 and pi7 ≤ 1 and hence (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) =
(E,E, P, P, P, P ). The 3P -string [3, 5] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.30: d∗1 ∈ {E,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (E,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (L,R,R), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1, pi2 = 1,
pi3 = −c, pi4 = −c, pi5 = 1− c, pi6 = 2 and pi7 ≤ 1− c and (y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) = (E,E, P,E,E).
Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). By Case A.5 we can find z ∈ F (y) such that p(z) ≤ p(y) − 1
and the 1P -string {4} disappears.
Case A.31: d∗1 ∈ {A,R,L}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,L,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1 − 2c,
pi2 ≤ 1−2c, pi3 = 2−c, pi4 = 2−c, pi5 = −c, pi6 = 1 and pi7 ≤ 1−c and hence (y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) =
(P, P, P,E,E).
If y1 = P, then Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1 and y contains a ≥4P -string.
If y1 = A, then Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Moreover, either Case A.28 or Case A.29
applies, so there is z ∈ F (y) such that the 3P -string [2, 4] grows and p(z) ≤ p(y).
If y1 = E, then Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Either Case A.26 applies and there is z ∈ F (y)
such that p(z) ≤ p(y) and the 3P -string [2, 4] grows or Case A.30 applies and there is z ∈ F (y)
such that p(z) ≤ p(y) and (z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) = (E,E, P,E,E) and there is w ∈ F (z) such that
p(w) ≤ p(z)− 1 and the 1P -string {3} disappears.
Case A.32: d∗1 = E, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (A,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {A,L}
Take (d3, d4, d5) = (R,R,L), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1, pi2 = −2c,
pi3 = 1 − c, pi4 = 2 − c, pi5 = 1 − c, pi6 = 1 and pi7 ≤ 1 and hence (y1, y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) =
(E,E, P, P, P,E). Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Either Case A.26 applies and there is
z ∈ F (y) such that the 3P -string [3, 5] grows and p(z) ≤ p(y) or Case A.30 applies and
there is z ∈ F (y) such that p(z) ≤ p(y) and (z2, z3, z4, z5, z6) = (E,E, P,E,E) and there is
w ∈ F (z) such that p(w) ≤ p(z)− 1 and the 1P -string {4} disappears.
Case A.33: d∗1 ∈ {A,R}, (x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (E,P, P, P,E) and d∗7 ∈ {A,L}
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Take (d3, d4, d5) = (L,R,R), for i 6= 3, 4, 5, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1 − c, pi2 = 2,
pi3 = −c, pi4 = −c, pi5 = 1− c, pi6 = 2 and pi7 ≤ 1− c and (y2, y3, y4, y5, y6) = (E,E, P,E,E).
Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). By Case A.5 we can find z ∈ F (y) such that p(z) ≤ p(y) − 1
and the 1P -string {4} disappears.
(x3, x4, x5) = (P, P, P ) (d
∗
6, d
∗
7) =
(A,A/R/L) (A,E) (E,E/R) (E,A/L)
(d
∗ 1,
d
∗ 2)
= (A/R/L,A) g (A.24) g (A.25) g (A.28) g; d (A.31)
(E,A) g (A.27) g (A.29) g; d (A.32)
(E/L,E) g (A.26) d (A.30)
(A/R,E) d (A.33)
Table 7: Strings resulting from 3P -strings surrounded from the left by the decisions in the
columns and from the right by the decisions in the rows. Abbreviations ‘g’ and ‘d’ in the cells
are used to identify whether the P -string will be growing or disappearing. Relevant cases are
in parentheses.
≥4P
A.25
A.26
A.29
A.24
A.28
A.27
A.32
A.31
A.30
A.33
0P
Figure 10: Transforming 3P -strings based on the cases specified in the squares results in the
P -strings in the circles.
A.5 ≥4P -strings
Lemma 9. Let 4 ≤ k < n and let [a, a+ k − 1] be a kP -string of the state x ∈ X. Then one
of the following three cases occurs:
(i) there is y ∈ F (x)∪F 2(x)∪F 3(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x) and y contains a ≥(k+1)P -string;
(ii) k is even and there is y ∈ F k/2(x) ∪ F k/2+1(x) ∪ F k/2+2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1;
(iii) k is odd and there is y ∈ F (k+1)/2(x) ∪ F (k+3)/2(x) such that p(y) ≤ p(x)− 1.
Proof. An agent who is surrounded by agents using the same strategy as him will not change
his strategy in one iteration. Therefore, an agent who is not at the very edge of a string
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cannot change his strategy within one iteration. That is why looking only at the ends of a
≥4P -string in a particular state provides enough information about the string’s development
in the next iteration. Cases A.34–A.36 below look at the ends of a ≥4P -string by considering
the outermost two agents in the P -string who implement the P -strategy and their closest
neighbors who do not implement it. These three cases along with the auxiliary Cases A.37–
A.38 constitute the preliminary cases that are needed to construct and describe all possible
≥4P -strings. This is done in Cases A.39–A.44. Cases A.34 and A.35 will be used in the
construction of ≥4P -strings which grow, while Case A.36 and Cases A.37–A.38 will be used
for the construction of ≥4P -strings which shrink.
Case A.34: (x1, x2, x3) = (P, P,A)
Let d be such that (d1, d2) = (R,L) and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 1−c, pi2 = 2−c and pi3 ≤ 1−2c.
(a) d4 ∈ {A,R,L,E} and pi4 ≤ 2− c: then (y1, y2, y3) = (P, P, P ).
(b) d4 = E and pi4 = 2: then (y1, y2, y3, y4) = (P, P,E,E).
Case A.35: (x1, x2, x3) = (P, P,E)
Let d be such that (d1, d2) = (R,L) and y = f(d). Then pi1 ∈ {1− c; 2− c} and pi2 = 1− c.
(a) d4 ∈ {R,E}: then pi3 = 0 and pi4 ≤ 1, hence (y1, y2, y3) = (P, P, P ).
(b) d4 ∈ {A,L} and pi1 = 2− c: then pi3 = 1 and pi4 ≤ 1− c, hence (y1, y2, y3) = (P, P,E).
(c) d4 ∈ {A,L} and pi1 = 1− c: then pi3 = 1 and pi4 ≤ 1− c, hence (y1, y2, y3) = (P,E,E).
Case A.36: (x1, x2, x3) = (P, P,E)
Let d be such that (d1, d2) = (L,R) and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1− c, pi2 = −c.
(a) d4 ∈ {A,L}: then pi3 = 2 and pi4 ≤ 1− c, hence (y1, y2, y3, y4) = (P,E,E,E).
(b) d4 ∈ {E,R}: then pi3 = 1 and pi4 ≥ 0, hence (y1, y2, y3) = (P,E,E).
(c) (d4, d5) = (E,E): then pi3 = 1 and pi4 = 0, hence (y1, y2, y3, y4) = (P,E,E,E).
Case A.37: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6) = (E,E, P, P,E,E)
Let d be such that (d3, d4) = (L,R) and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≤ 1, pi2 = 1, pi3 = −c, pi4 = −c,
pi5 = 1 and pi6 ≤ 1, hence (y2, y3, y4, y5) = (E,E,E,E).
Case A.38: (x1, x2, x3, x4, x5, x6, x7, x8) = (E,E, P, P, P,E,E,E)
Let d be such that (d3, d4, d5) = (L,R,R) and y = f(d). Then pi1 ≥ 0, pi2 = 1, pi3 = −c, pi4 =
−c, pi5 = 1 − c, pi6 = 1, pi7 = 0 and pi8 ≥ 0, hence (y2, y3, y4, y5, y6, y7) = (E,E, P,E, P,E).
Now Case A.10 applies and there is z ∈ F (y) such that (z3, z4, z5, z6, z7) = (E,E,E,E,E)
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and p(z) ≤ p(y)− 2.
This concludes the preliminary cases which are needed to handle the ones outlined below.
Cases A.39–A.44 that follow explicitly describe the development of every ≥4P -string that
can occur in the current framework using the preliminary cases presented above. Table 8
summarizes the outcomes. It is important to note that in some instances considering the
closest one neighboring agent to a ≥4P -string is sufficient, while in other cases the closest
two neighbors are needed. This is specified in every separate case.
Case A.39: (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (A,P, . . . , P,A)
Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y =
f(d). If Case A.34(a) applies on at least one of the sides, then the kP -string [2, k + 1]
grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Otherwise, Case A.34(b) applies for both sides,
(y0, y1, y2, . . . , yk, yk+1, yk+2) = (E,E, P, . . . , P, E,E), and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Take d′2 = R, d′3 = L, d′k = R, d
′
k+1 = L, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, d′i = d∗i , and z = f(d′).
According to Case A.35(a), (z1, . . . , zk+1) = (P, . . . , P ), the kP -string [2, k + 1] grows, and
Lemma 3 implies p(z) ≤ p(y).
Case A.40: (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (A,P, . . . , P, E) and d
∗
k+3 ∈ {E,R}
Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). By
Case A.34 and Case A.35(a), the kP -string [2, k+1] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.41: d∗0 ∈ {E,L}, (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (E,P, . . . , P, E) and d∗k+3 ∈ {E,R}
Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k+1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). According
to Case A.35(a), the kP -string [2, k + 1] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
Case A.42: d∗0 ∈ {E,L}, (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (E,P, . . . , P, E) and d∗k+3 ∈ {A,L}
Define x0 = x. Take d02 = L, d
0
3 = R, d
0
k = L, d
0
k+1 = R, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, d0i = d∗i , and
x1 = f(d0). According to Case A.36(a) and (b), the kP -string shrinks from both sides. It
holds that (x11, x
1
2, x
1
3, . . . , x
1
k, x
1
k+1, x
1
k+2, x
1
k+3) = (E,E, P, . . . , P, E,E,E). Lemma 3 implies
p(x1) ≤ p(x0). For m = 1, . . . , b(k− 4)/2c, define dm2+m = L, dm3+m = R, dmk−m = L, dmk−m+1 =
R, for i 6= 2 + m, 3 + m, k − m, k − m + 1, dmi = d∗i , and xm+1 = f(dm). According to
Case A.36(c), it holds that xm+1 has a (k−2m−2)P -string [3+m, k−m] and xm+11+m = xm+12+m =
xm+1k−m+1 = x
m+1
k−m+2 = x
m+1
k−m+3 = E. Lemma 3 implies that p(x
m+1) ≤ p(xm). If k is even, then
take d
k/2−1
k/2+1 = L, d
k/2−1
k/2+1 = R, for i 6= k/2 + 1, k/2 + 2, d
k/2−1
i = d
∗
i , and x
k/2 = f(dk/2 − 1).
According to Case A.37, it holds that the 2P -string [k/2+1, k/2+2] disappears and Lemma 3
implies that p(xk/2) ≤ p(xk/2−1) − 1. If k is odd, then take d(k−3)/2(k+1)/2 = L, d
(k−3)/2
(k+3)/2 = R,
d
(k−3)/2
(k+5)/2 = R, for i 6= (k+ 1)/2, (k+ 3)/2, (k+ 5)/2, d
(k−3)/2
i = d
∗
i , and x
(k−1)/2 = f(d(k−3)/2).
According to Case A.38, it holds that x(k−1)/2 has two 1P -strings {(k+1)/2} and {(k+5)/2}.
Lemma 3 implies that p(x(k−1)/2) ≤ p(x(k−3)/2) + 1. Moreover, according to Case A.38, there
is x(k+1)/2 ∈ F (x(k−1)/2) such that p(x(k+1)/2) ≤ p(x(k−1)/2)−2 and the 1P -strings {(k+1)/2}
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and {(k + 5)/2} disappear.
Case A.43: d∗0 ∈ {A,R}, (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (E,P, . . . , P, E) and d∗k+3 ∈ {A,L}
Take d2 = L, d3 = R, dk = L, dk+1 = R, for i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d).
According to Case A.36(a) the kP -string shrinks from both sides. It holds that (y1, y2, y3, . . .,
yk, yk+1, yk+2, yk+3) = (E,E, P, . . . , P, E,E,E). Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). From here,
the argument is identical to the one in Case A.42.
Case A.44: (x1, x2, . . . , xk+1, xk+2) = (A,P, . . . , P, E) and d
∗
k+3 ∈ {A,L}
On the left-hand side either Case A.34(a) or Case A.34(b) applies and on the right-hand side
either Case A.35(b) or Case A.35(c) applies. This give rise to the following four possibilities:
(i) Case A.34(a) and Case A.35(b). Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for i 6=
2, 3, k, k+ 1, di = d
∗
i , and y = f(d). The kP -string [2, k+ 1] grows and Lemma 3 implies
p(y) ≤ p(x).
(ii) Case A.34(b) and Case A.35(b). Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for
i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). It holds that (y0, y1, y2, . . . , yk+1, yk+2) =
(E,E, P, . . . , P, E) and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). Either Case A.41 or Case A.42
applies. In the former case there is z ∈ F (y) such that the kP -string [2, k+1] grows and
Lemma 3 implies p(z) ≤ p(y). In the latter case, if k is even there is xk/2 ∈ F k/2(y) such
that p(xk/2) ≤ p(y)− 1 and the kP -string [2, k + 1] shrinks until it disappears, and if k
is odd there is x(k+1)/2 ∈ F (k+1)/2(y) such that p(x(k+1)/2) ≤ p(y)−1 and the kP -string
[2, k + 1] shrinks until it disappears.
(iii) Case A.34(a) and Case A.35(c). Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for
i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). It holds that (y1, . . . , yk, yk+1, yk+2) =
(P, . . . , P,E,E) and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x). If y0 = P then y contains a ≥(k+1)P -
string and we are done, so consider the case where y0 6= P. Either Case A.40, Case A.41
or Case A.42 applies. If Case A.40 applies there is z ∈ F (y) such that the kP -string
[1, k] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(z) ≤ p(y). For the other two cases, the argument is
identical to the one in (ii).
(iv) Case A.34(b) and Case A.35(c). Take d2 = R, d3 = L, dk = R, dk+1 = L, for
i 6= 2, 3, k, k + 1, di = d∗i , and y = f(d). It holds that (y0, y1, y2, . . . , yk, yk+1, yk+2) =
(E,E, P, . . . , P, E,E) and Lemma 3 implies p(y) ≤ p(x).
We first consider the case k ≥ 5. Take d′2 = R, d′3 = L, d′k−1 = R, d′k = L, for
i 6= 2, 3, k − 1, k, d′i = d∗i , and z = f(d′). It holds by Case A.35(a) that (z1, . . . , zk+1) =
(P, . . . , P ), so the kP -string [2, . . . , k + 1] grows and Lemma 3 implies p(z) ≤ p(y).
Now consider the case k = 4. Case A.34(b) implies pi0 = 2, so d−1 ∈ {A,R} and
pi−1 ≤ 1− c, and hence y−1 = E. Take d′2 = R, d′3 = R, d′4 = L, for i 6= 2, 3, 4, d′i = d∗i ,
36
and z = f(d′). It holds that (z0, z1, z2, z3, z4, z5) = (E,E, P, P, P, P ) and Lemma 3
implies p(z) ≤ p(y). The argument now continues as in (iii).
(d3, . . . , dk+2) = (d
∗
k+3, d
∗
k+4) =
(P, . . . , P ) (A,A/R/L/E) (E,E/R) (E,A/L)
(d
∗ 1,
d
∗ 2) (A/R/L/E,A) g (A.39) g (A.40) g; d (A.44)
(E/L,E) g (A.41) d (A.42)
(A/R,E) d (A.43)
Table 8: Resulting structures for ≥ 4P -strings surrounded from the left by the decisions in
the columns and from the right by the decisions in the rows. Abbreviations ‘g’ and ‘d’ in
the cells are used to identify whether the P -string will be growing or disappearing. Relevant
cases are in parentheses.
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